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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between the cost of child care and the employment
behavior of married and single mothers.   The data used in this paper are from the 1987 SIPP, the
first SIPP panel to utilize an improved probing of child care usage and expenditures.  A primary
contribution of this paper stems from the use of these improved child care data.  A second
contribution is to provide a clear comparison between single mothers and married mothers.  A
third contribution of this paper is its detailed discussion of participation elasticities, with a
comparison of elasticities derived from different measures of the price of child care.  This permits
a meaningful comparison between the different child care price elasticities reported by different
child care researchers in recent years.
The paper's primary estimating equations examine the impact of changes in the market
wage and the hourly price of child care on employment and hours of paid child care.  The most
fundamental result described in this paper is that increases in the market wage significantly
increase the probability of labor force participation for married and single mothers, while
increases in the price of care reduce the probability of labor force participation.1
     
1As has been pointed out by other authors (for example, Blau 1991), it is likely that this self-reporting of what
"would have been, had child care been available" is probably an overstating of the actual child care availability
problem.
CHILD CARE AND THE EMPLOYMENT BEHAVIOR
OF SINGLE AND MARRIED MOTHERS
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the relationship between the cost of child care and the employment
behavior of married and single mothers.   The data used in this paper are from the 1987 SIPP, the
first SIPP panel to utilize an improved probing of child care usage and expenditures.  A primary
contribution of this paper stems from the use of these improved child care data.  A second
contribution is to provide a clear comparison between single mothers and married mothers.  A
third contribution of this paper is its detailed discussion of participation elasticities, with a
comparison of elasticities derived from different measures of the price of child care.  This permits
a meaningful comparison between the different child care price elasticities reported by different
child care researchers in recent years.
The paper's primary estimating equations examine the impact of changes in the market
wage and the hourly price of child care on employment and hours of paid child care.  The most
fundamental result described in this paper is that increases in the market wage significantly
increase the probability of labor force participation for married and single mothers, while
increases in the price of care reduce the probability of labor force participation.
Child Care, Employment Behavior and Public Policy
The labor force participation behavior of parents is inextricably linked with the availability
of affordable, quality child care.  Particularly for mothers (and more so for single mothers),
insufficient child care options can be a strong barrier to labor force participation.  This pessimistic
scenario is precisely the situation described by Cattan in the October 1991 Monthly Labor Review,
and repeated below.
"...many young mothers who were not employed reported that difficulty obtaining
child-care was the major reason they were unable to enter the labor force.  This
was particularly true for poor mothers.  Paying for child care was not a realistic
long-term option for most poor mothers, and this restricted the child care available
to them.  This implies a 'catch-22' situation: without child care, they could not
look for work, and without work they could not pay for child care."
1  (page 7)2
     
2The potential impact of extending transitional benefits is part of the research agendas of major research groups.
See for example, Bell and Grover (1992) of Abt Associates and Sonenstein, et al (1990) of SysteMetrics for examples
of these investigations.
     
3Note that these mothers were not assigned child care assistance randomly, so there is likely some self-selection
in the process.  In other words, it is likely that mothers who pursued and obtained child care assistance are in some
consistent way different from those mothers who did not manage to obtain
Additionally, there is a strong link between employment and poverty status:  82 percent
of female-headed households in which the mother works fulltime do not live in poverty; however,
fewer than one-half of female heads were employed fulltime in 1991.  Therefore, it is likely that
a policy initiative designed with the goal of strengthening the labor force attachment of female
household heads would also substantially raise the living standards of these households.  Foley
(1992) provides the most recent evidence regarding the poverty crisis facing female household
heads.  Foley shows that approximately 20 percent of all American households are headed by
women, of which 47 percent have income below the poverty line, and 25 percent live between the
poverty line and two times the poverty line.  
  The poverty crisis facing female heads is clearly at the forefront of the domestic policy
agendas of most industrialized nations.  For example, one component the (U.S.) Family Support
Act of 1988 addressed the availability of transitional benefits (specifically, extended Medicaid
coverage and child care assistance) for female heads trying to work their way off AFDC support.
2
However, no research on female heads has been conducted to date that thoroughly models the full
costs of employment.  This paper focusses on child care, a primary factor associated with female
employment behavior.
Evidence of the link between extended transitional benefits and labor force attachment can
be seen in the GAO's June 1992 Report to Congress regarding specific actions needed to improve
upon JTPA participant support services.  A summary of the GAO's findings are below.
"In the five SDAs (local service delivery areas) we studied, participants who needed
and received one specific support service, namely child care, achieved better
program outcomes than those who did not receive needed support.  Participants at
the five SDAs we visited who were single parents with a child under age 6 and who
enrolled in a training activity were presumed to need child care services.  We found
that the single parents who received child care assistance, whether through JTPA
or elsewhere, more often successfully completed their training and more often
obtained jobs or experienced another positive outcome, such as returning to school,
than those who did not (see Fig. 1).  About 69 percent of single parents who
received child care completed their training compared to 45 percent for those not
receiving such care.  Similarly, about 68 percent of those receiving child care got
jobs or had other positive outcomes, such as completing a major level of education,
compared to 49 percent of those not receiving child care."
3  3
such assistance.
     
4I thank Kevin Hollenbeck for his input on this issue.
The Role of Child Care Quality in the Public Policy Debate
As evidenced by the growing literature linking child care issues to public policy, a
consensus exists amongst most of today's policy-makers that the government should play some
role in the child care market.  James Walker (1991) presents a concise argument for the possible
causes of government interest in the child care market.  As he discusses, if the child care market
is imperfect (i.e., suffers from inefficiencies or inequities), then the government has a motivation
for intervening in the market's provision of child care services.  By definition, the existence of
a perfect market requires that several conditions hold, including the perfect flow of information
between the supply and demand sides of the market.  Many child care researchers claim that
demanders of child care services are unable to procure sufficient information regarding the quality
of child care.  If there is reason to believe that the government can improve this communication
failure, then the government has a clear reason for intervening in the child care market.
According to Kisker and Maynard (1991), the government's advantage lies in its access to relevant
research and its ability to use this information to formulate child care policies, including tax
credits, regulations, and licensing standards.  An important caveat is the recognition that specific
policies create incentives that alter child care demands, so policy makers must be certain that the
underlying quality of the information is accurate and sufficiently comprehensive.
The presence of a public good also opens up the possibility of market inefficiencies.
4  If
the benefits of high-quality, readily-available child care are enjoyed by society at large, then the
child care market may not reflect these external benefits.  This implies another source of market
failure that could be rectified by government intervention into the child care market.
A second component of the market failure argument lies in the potential for the inequitable
distribution of child care services.  Those families that could most benefit from quality, affordable
child care (due to the necessity of two incomes to achieve a living family wage) may simply not
have access to such care.  While economists tend to focus on the inefficiencies in the child care
market rather than the inequities, the latter cannot be ignored in the policy debate.
While most child care experts agree that there is an insufficient supply of quality child care
in the United States, there is significant disagreement about what defines quality care.  The bulk
of this problem is presented quite clearly by David Blau in Chapter 6 of his book entitled The
Economics of Child Care (1991).  He explains that the quality issue is viewed differently by
economists than by child development experts.  According to Blau, "Educators stress the process
through which children achieve cognitive, emotional, and social development.  Economists
incorporate this process in their models, but stress the role of parental preferences and substitution
in determining the child care choices made by parents" (p. 170).  The research presented in this4
paper uses an economist's model to examine the relationships between child care costs and labor
force participation behavior.
The approach taken in the modelling of child care quality may affect the resulting
relationship found between child care quality and the price of care.  According to Blau (1991),
there is little evidence of a positive relationship between quality as determined from child
development and child care expenditures.  However, with quality measured in terms of provider
characteristics (such as child-staff ratios), "higher priced options are likely to provide higher
quality care.  Without controlling for quality, the effect of price on choice will be a combination
of price effects (expected to be negative) and quality effects (expected to be positive)" (Hofferth
and Wissoker, p. 73, 1992).  Clearly, then, if empirical methods do not adequately control
quality, the estimated impact of price on child care mode choice may be skewed.
Literature Review
With the rapid increases in the labor force participation rates of women during the 1960's
and 1980's (and particularly, the rise in LFP rates for mothers of young children), came the desire
in the social science research community to understand the nature of child care choices and the
relationship between child care issues and employment behavior.  The lack of child care data
meant that the first step to achieving this goal was in the procurement of usable information
regarding child care usage and costs.  Several large data procurement efforts were conducted
during the 1970's to provide the means with which to fill this gap in the empirical literature.  As
a result of these efforts,  numerous publications appeared in the 1970's and early 1980's in an
attempt to provide rigorous evidence regarding the effect of child care costs on the demand for
children and labor force behavior.  However, as will be seen below, there is no reason to conclude
from these studies that the key research issues are resolved.
The first of these surveys was Day Care Survey 1970.  This survey was conducted by
Westinghouse Learning Corporation and Westat Research, Inc., under contract to the Office of
Economic Opportunity.  According to Day Care Survey-1970:  Summary Report and Basic
Analyses (1971), this survey represented the first nationwide child care survey conducted in the
United States.  It was designed to collect information regarding the various sources of child care
services, ranging from casual arrangements with family and friends to formal, full-day care from
fully-licensed day care centers.  The researchers concluded that there was a substantial, currently
unmet, demand for quality day care.  Additionally, they found little trustworthy care available for
school-aged children before and after school.
The largest of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments, the Seattle Income
Maintenance Experiment and the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, abbreviated as
SIME/DIME, was conducted in the early 1970's.  Both cities' experiments incorporated a
significant child care subsidy component to the NIT program.  A very extensive literature stems
from these experimental data, the bulk of which can be found in Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
research memoranda published from the mid-1970's to the early 1980's.  Several of these memos5
address the intricate relationships between child care cost and availability and female labor force
behavior, but none provide direct evidence of the explicit effects of child care costs on women's
labor force participation.   Therefore, while some of the memos do make claims against the
advisability of using child care subsidies to strengthen mothers' labor force attachment, their
conclusions cannot be considered as scientific evidence in the current policy debate.
One of the first major child care research efforts published by an economist is the seminal
article by Heckman (1974).  He examined the relationship between child care costs and female
labor supply, and found a significant negative effect of the cost of care on labor supply.
Additionally, he found that the presence of young children significantly reduced mothers' labor
supply efforts, even with child care costs controlled.
The next major child care research effort published in a major economics journal was
conducted by Robins and Spiegelman (1978) using SIME/DIME data.  Although they did not
utilize available econometric techniques designed to correct for potential selection biases, their
research provided updated information regarding the factors that influence the demand for paid
child care by two parent families in which the mother works.  They found that the demand for
paid child care is responsive to prices and income.  A major contribution of their work were their
predictions regarding child care usage for different individual characteristics and a variety of child
care subsidies.
Blau and Robins (1988) utilize 1980 EOPP data to estimate the impact of child care costs
on the mother's employment behavior and use of formal and informal child care modes.  They
average the individual family's child care expenditures across families within a given geographical
area in constructing a child care price measure.  They found that higher child care costs are
negatively related to the probability that the mother will participate in the labor force.  
Several child care research efforts have appeared in the literature in the past five years that
rely on two relatively new data sources: the NLS-Youth and the SIPP.  Michalopoulos et al (1992)
develop and implement a full structural model to estimate child care mode choices and labor force
participation choices simultaneously, using SIPP data from the 1984 panel.  They focus on both
married and single women in their analyses, but do not provide estimates of the effect of child
care costs on women's labor force participation status.  Connelly (1990) also uses the SIPP in her
focus on single women with an explicit joint modelling of AFDC recipiency and employment
behavior.  Connelly (1992) uses the same data source to focus on married women.  Neither paper
provides a detailed theoretical model with the same technical detail as Michalopoulos et al (1992),
but the empirical techniques are sophisticated and clearly appropriate.  Ribar (1990, 1992)
implements both structural and reduced form models to estimate the impact of child care costs on
employment behavior and the utilization of both paid and unpaid child care.  Ribar (1992)
provides the basis for the empirical analyses found in this paper.6
     
5A family labor supply model (see, for example, Blau and Robins 1988), would include the leisure time of other
adults in the household as arguments in the family utility function.  I treat other adult household members' leisure
time as exogenous, but plan to address the potential endogeneity of household composition in later research.  
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE UNDERLYING BEHAVIORAL MODEL
The behavioral model underlying the empirical work in this paper is drawn from the partial
reduced form specification developed in detail by Ribar (1992).  While a full structural
implementation may have broader appeal, the limitations inherent in such a model are too severe
for this paper.  An example of an excellent derivation of a full structural model can be found in
Michalopoulos, et al (1992).  A key restriction of that derivation is its requirement that the mother
maximize utility over three distinct states:  no market work so no paid child care; some market
work with all unpaid care; and some market work with all paid care.  This is an unfortunate
restriction given that it is common for mothers to utilize a combination of paid and unpaid care
particularly for school-aged children.
In this paper, mothers are assumed to maximize utility (seen in equation (1)), where utility
is expressed as a function of leisure time (L), market goods (G), and child care quality (CQ).
5
The constraints in this maximization problem include a time constraint, a money budget constraint,
and a production function for child care services.  The mother's total time can be divided between
market work time, leisure time, and time devoted to child care.  Because it is not possible to
distinguish leisure time from home production time (including child care time), total available time
(T) can be expressed as the sum of market work time (H) and leisure time (L).
(1) maximize U = U(G, CQ, L)
subject to the following constraints.
(2) T = H + L.
(3) G + Pcc*Cp + Scc*Cn = Y + W*H.
(4) CQ = fn(Cm, Cp, Cn, X, HH, M).
The budget constraint faced by the mother is shown in equation (3), where total
expenditures equal total income.   Potential budget outlays include expenditures on market goods
and child care services.  Pcc is the (hourly) price of paid child care, Scc is the (hourly) shadow
price of nonpaid child care, Y is nonlabor income (calculated as total family income minus earned
income and AFDC income), W is the (hourly) market wage, and H is hours of market work.  As
explained by Ribar (1992), the shadow price of nonpaid care represents the opportunity cost of
the free care-provider's time.  Without explicitly incorporating some sort of cost of nonpaid care
into the budget constraint, the solution to the maximization problem would imply that the demand7
     
6See Blank (1988) for an example of this cost of work formulation.
for paid child care is always zero.  See Ribar (1992) for a description of criticisms to this
approach.  
Note that (Pcc*Cp + Scc*Cn) represents total cost of work, expressed in hours of paid
work-related services.  (Here, the only costs of work are child care costs.
6)  Costs of work are not
shown as a function of actual work hours because child care usage can exceed work hours due to
transportation time, for example.  However, the mother's choice of hours of paid child care is
directly related to the hours of work decision.  Because costs of work appear in the budget
constraint with some direct relationship to work effort, any factors affecting costs of work will
also affect the mother's work decision.
An important factor in the budget constraint is the means-tested nature of AFDC (and other
work-tied transfers).  If the mother takes a paid job with a sufficiently high salary (particularly
a fulltime job), then she will not be eligible for AFDC coverage.  The resulting nonlinearities in
the budget constraint create econometric complexities that I do not directly address in this paper.
For this paper, I begin the empirical work by addressing the endogeneity of AFDC income
tangentially by the labor force participation correction.  (Michalopoulos, et al also rely upon this
ad hoc correction, although the focal point of their research is not single mothers.)  After
estimating the LFP probit for single mothers as a single equation, I jointly estimate equations for
the discrete AFDC and LF participation decisions. 
A child care quality production function is given in equation (4).  In this expression,
factors affecting child care quality include hours of maternal care (Cm), hours of paid nonmaternal
care (Cp), hours of unpaid nonmaternal care (Cn), the mother's personal characteristics (X), her
household characteristics (HH), and regional characteristics (M).  The regional characteristics
include state child care regulations and state wage levels.  
The maximization of this utility function subject to the three constraints yields three
demand functions (excluding the demand for market goods), representing the demand for leisure,
the demand for paid child care services (controlling for quality), and the demand for unpaid child
care services.  I focus on the first two demand functions in this paper.  These two estimating
equations are shown below.  Ideally, these two equations would be estimated simultaneously,
because a consequence of the jointness of the two decisions is a potential correlation across the
two equation errors.  However, this paper estimates the two equations separately.
(5) LFP = fn(X, HH, M, W, Pcc, A)
(6) Cp  = fn(X, HH, M, W, Pcc, A)8
     
7As Ribar (1992) explains, the only theoretical predictions from this model are that an increase in the wage leads
to a decline in the probability of labor force participation and an increase in the price of paid care leads to a decline
in the use of paid child care.
In the above, X and HH represent the mother's personal and household characteristics, M
represents regional characteristics, A represents factors influencing the mother's demand for
leisure time, and W and Pcc represent the potential market wage and potential child care price.
One could imagine incorporating a measure of the "net" hourly wage, in which the hourly price
paid for child care is subtracted from the full hourly wage measure.  I enter W and Pcc as distinct
terms for two reasons.  First, while information about child care usage is obtained only for labor
force participants, the total number of hours worked per week is not constrained to be equal to the
number of paid child care hours.  Recall that child care can be divided between paid and unpaid
care, and it is possible that total weekly paid care hours could exceed total hours worked that week
(due to time spent in direct transit to and from work, as well as time spent running errands before
and after work).  Second, there is no reason to present the LFP responsiveness to wage changes
and the LFP responsiveness to price of care changes in a single parameter estimate.  Perhaps this
assumption would be more reasonable were the two measures true marginal wage and price of care
measures, but since they are closer to average measures in these data, one might expect the two
elasticities to be quite different.  This paper's sensitivity analyses will include a test of this
specification.
7
Because employment behavior (not the continuous labor supply decision) is the focus of
this paper, equation (5) is shown with the 0-1 LFP dependent variable.  This LFP equation will
be estimated via probit.  Equation (6) represents the demand equation for paid child care.  Here,
the dependent variable is the hours of paid care per child.  I will estimate this equation including
the workers who do not use the paid child care options.  This suggests using the tobit model for
estimation.  Note that there is nothing in this model development that requires the mother to rely
exclusively on paid (versus unpaid) child care.
In addition, there are two supporting equations to be estimated.  First, a wage equation is
estimated to produce a wage measure (purged of measurement error) for all women (regardless
of labor force participation status).  Second, a child care price equation is estimated in order to
produce an instrument for the hourly price of child care for all women, even those women not
participating in the labor force, as well as those working women NOT paying for any child care.
The results of these two equations are used to calculate predicted values for the wage and the
hourly price of care, both regressors in the two primary equations listed earlier. 
The empirical work begins with the estimation of the wage and child care price
instrumenting equations.  Each of these equations suffers from sample selection:  the wage is
observed only for labor force participants, and child care price is observed only for labor force
participants who pay for child care.  To correct the LFP sample selection in the wage equation a9
Heckit-type correction term is included as a regressor.  This term is known as the Inverse Mills
Ratio, and is calculated from the results of a reduced form labor force participation probit.
The appropriate selection correction for the child care price equation is more complicated
because the selection is a result of two (sequential) discrete decisions:  first, the 0-1 labor force
participation (LFP) choice, then the decision regarding the use of paid child care.  The two
decisions are considered to be sequential not because one choice is actually made prior to the other
choice, but rather, because the child care choice is only observed for LFP=1, therefore the "cell"
of LFP=0 with paid care is never observed.  Consequently, the two equations cannot be
considered a bivariate probit in the strict sense of the term.  This selection correction technique
produces two terms akin to Heckman's single-termed Inverse Mills Ratio.  I refer to these terms
as LAMBDA1 and LAMBDA2 in the empirical discussion to follow.  A detailed presentation of
this selection correction can be found in Tunali (1986), and an application of the procedure in the
child care literature can be found in Michalopoulos, et al (1992).  
The technique of predicting the price of child care out of sample as described above is not
without its critics.  Hotz and Kilburn (1991) exploit the availability of child care data for
nonworking mothers to test the validity of using data on workers only to explain the demand for
child care for nonworking mothers.  They find that the demand for child care for preschoolers for
working mothers is substantively different from that of ALL households.  In addition they find
that the child care demand of those nonworking households is more price-sensitive than when the
mother works, and that these nonworking households are more likely to be comprised of lower
income nonwhites.  Their research shows that care must be taken when attempting to predict the
hourly price of care out of sample.  However, due to the SIPP's unavailability of child care data
for nonworking mothers, I will rely on the standard approach.  In any event, it is possible that
these nonworking mothers utilize a type of child care that they themselves would not utilize were
they to work.  For example, they may be relying on a child care mode with a high hourly cost if
used for a limited number of hours per week, but which would be much less expensive on an
hourly basis if used more intensively.  Even within the SIPP, there is strong evidence that child
care users can exploit economies of scale.  (US Dept. of Commerce, "Who's Minding the Kids?"
1992)  In addition, because the focus of this paper is employment behavior, it is reasonable to use
child care data obtained from working mothers.
After the two instrumenting equations have been estimated, the next step is to estimate
equations (5) and (6).  The two equations share the same regressor list, including the (predicted)
hourly price of child care, the (predicted) hourly market wage, the mother's education, race, age
and age-squared, her nonlabor income and the number of children in her family.  The age-
distribution of her children is not included because its impact is controlled via the predicted price
of care.  
In summary, the order of estimation is as follows.  First, a pure reduced form labor force
participation probit equation is estimated in order to construct an Inverse Mills Ratio for use in
the Heckit-corrected wage equation.  Then, the LFP and pay-for-care equations are estimated via
bivariate probit to allow construction of the two bivariate selection terms.  The second step in10
estimation is to estimate the wage and child care price equations in order to create predicted hourly
wages and predicted hourly child care expenditures to be used as regressors in other equations.
Then, the two primary equations will be estimated separately to determine the impact of the
market wage and price of child care on LFP and child care choices.  Finally, the LFP and AFDC
probit equations will be estimated jointly to gauge the impact of incorporating their jointness on
the single LFP equation's parameter estimates.  
III. DATA
The data used in this paper are from the 1987 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative longitudinal sample.  The SIPP data are the most
useful of the various survey data sets for this project for a number of reasons.  First, in the SIPP,
the surveys are conducted every four months so that recall error is less severe than with annual
surveys.  Second, the primary purpose of the SIPP is to procure quality income information--there
are approximately 50 different income sources detailed in the SIPP.  These various sources of
income are particularly important if one is to examine the labor force participation behavior of
lower-income individuals, a category in which many female household heads fall.  Finally, the
SIPP collects information regarding child care usage and fees paid, work and fertility history, and
education and training.
Description of Revised Child Care Questionnaire
Each SIPP panel contains detailed child care information for working women in special
supplements (called topical modules) at the third and sixth interview.  (In the SIPP, an interview
is referred to as a wave.)  Therefore, the child care information is available at two separate time
periods, a fact that hopefully will permit the exploitation of panel data estimation methods in later
research.  The child care topical module includes questions concerning the type and cost of
primary and secondary care utilized by the mother for up to three children.  Additional questions
are asked regarding the reliability of this care.
The SIPP began with the 1984 panel and additional panels have been started each year
through 1992.  However, wave 6 of the 1987 panel marked the first interview at which a
substantially revamped child care questionnaire was implemented.  In previous child care modules,
the mother was asked questions about the mode of care used for up to three children.  However,
child care expenditures were measured only in aggregate, so that in families with more than one
child in care (or one child in more than one type of care) it is impossible to distinguish paid child
care hours from unpaid child care hours.  All of the previous child care research using the SIPP
has relied on the 1984 Panel.  Ribar (1992) includes a description of the complex approximation
procedure he implemented to assign hours of care to paid versus nonpaid care.  The revised child
care questionnaire eliminates this need for approximation.11
     
8A mother is counted as paying for care if she reports a positive dollar amount paid for care.  This continuous
variable was relied on due to the (infrequent) discrepancy between the response to the question "Did you pay for this
care?" and "How much did you pay for this care?"
Additionally, because the revised questionnaire contains these more detailed, probing
questions regarding hours and cost of care, the resulting data are considered more trustworthy.
(See US Dept. of Commerce, "Who's Minding the Kids?" 1992).  A primary contribution of this
paper is the exploitation of the improved quality of the key child care variables.
Description of Data Used in Estimation
This paper focusses on the employment and child care utilization behavior of mothers,
therefore, the estimating samples include females, ages 18 through 55, who are mothers or
guardians of children under the age of 13.  It is assumed that by the time children reach the
teenaged years, they require very little child care, the bulk of which is provided via school.
Additionally, teenagers are frequently child care providers themselves, be it providing free care
for siblings or other relatives, or limited hours of paid babysitting.  
The SIPP child care data are available for the last week prior to the interview date.
Earnings information are available at the month level, and hours worked per week are available
for a "typical week" during the entire four-month interview period.  Due to these time-period
discrepancies, I have chosen to aggregate the child care data up to the month level, to match the
labor market information.  This is the same aggregation procedure followed by Ribar (1992).
The data for this paper are stratified by marital status into two estimating samples.  The
married sample includes only those women who are married with a spouse present.  All women
not reporting that status are considered to be single.  There are 2,405 women in the married
sample and 716 women in the single sample.  Additionally, 629 married women report paying for
care, and 177 single mothers report paying for care.
8  Means for the variables used in the
empirical analyses are found in Table 1 and the variable definitions are in Figure 1.  See that the
married women are more educated on average than the single women, and working women who
use paid care are more educated than those who do not pay for care.  In addition, the percentage
of single mothers receiving AFDC support is high (29 percent), with a significant fraction of the
working single mothers who pay for care (7 percent) also receiving AFDC support.
Mothers in the married sample have on average nearly 2 children--see that the number of
children is lower for the single mothers.  In these data, married mothers are more likely to have
older children than the single mothers.  There are significant racial composition differences in the
married and single samples as well.  While 11 percent of the married sample is nonwhite, 33
percent of the single sample is nonwhite.12
     
9I use three as the upper limit for the number of children because in this wave of the SIPP, this is the maximum
number of children for whom the child care information was collected separately.  Note that few families have more
The labor force participation rates for the two samples are nearly identical at approximately
59 percent.  Additionally, while the married mothers who pay for care have on average higher
earnings and higher wages, the single mothers work more hours per week.  For working mothers
paying for care, usual hours per week is greater than 35, the standard cutoff for fulltime status.
Previous data have shown that 70 percent of working single mothers work fulltime (Foley 1992).
Page 3 of Table 1 shows means for the child care data.  For married mothers paying for
care, the average number of paid hours per month is 28.49; the corresponding figure for single
mothers is 27.87.  For working mothers paying for care, married mothers pay more per month
for care than single mothers ($237 versus $201), but the two groups spend nearly identical
fractions of their monthly earnings on child care, approximately 10 percent.  However, when total
family income is considered (NONLABY + earnings) single mothers pay twice the percentage
of their income in child care than do the married mothers.  Finally, the key child care price
measure (PRCARE1), the average hourly amount paid in child care in terms of the mother's work
hours, is consistent with the figures presented in "Who's Minding the Kids?" (US Dept. of
Commerce, 1992)   Working married mothers pay $1.71 per hour worked, while single mothers
pay $1.34 per hour worked.  While single mothers tend to have younger children (needing care
that is typically more costly than care for older children), they are more likely to rely on relative
care, a much cheaper source of care than formal market care.  
  Tables 2A and 2B show the distribution of modes of care for children of employed women
who report using nonmaternal child care.  These figures are shown for children of single and
married women.  In the table, relative care includes care provided by a spouse (if married), an
immediate family member, or grandparent.  Formal care includes day/group care centers, nursery
or preschool, or organized school-based activities (before or after school).  
Preschool children of single mothers in paid care are approximately 30 percent more likely
to be cared for by a relative than preschool children of married mothers.  However, the rates of
unpaid relative care for all preteen children do not vary much across the mother's marital status.
In addition, preschool children of single mothers in both paid and unpaid care are nearly twice as
likely to use school as the primary source of care (although the cell size here is small).  On the
other hand, preschool children of married mothers are more likely to be in paid formal care than
children of single mothers; however, the opposite is true of unpaid formal care.
The primary measure of the hourly price of child care utilized in this paper is named
PRCARE1.  This variable is constructed by dividing the total amount paid for child care that
month for up to three children by the total hours worked that month.  This measure is hourly in
the same sense that the wage is an hourly wage.  This is the measure utilized by Rachel Connelly
in her child care research.
9  For the sake of comparability, I conduct sensitivity analyses to13
than three children under the age of 13, and very few families have more
than three preteen children in some form of paid care.  Only 1.7% of working single mothers and 2.3% of working
married mothers have more than three children under 13 years old, with only 0.5% and 0.3% (respectively) of these
mothers paying for more than three children in care.
     
10Information regarding taxes and subsidies has not been incorporated into the hourly wage and hourly price of
care measures.  A full-fledged estimation of a kinky-budget constraint model is beyond the scope of this paper, and
there is no evidence to date that suggests incorporating the more ad hoc tax-calculation techniques (such as that
implemented by Michalopolous, et al (1992)) have a discernible impact on the key results.
     
11Many thanks to Gwen Morgan of Work/Family Directions, Inc. for providing these data and continued
consultations.
determine the sensitivity of the results to this particular construction.  In these analyses, I
experiment with two additional child care price measures, named PRCARE2 and PRCARE3.
These two measures are defined below.  PRCARE2 is the price of care per hour worked (as in
PRCARE1) per child in paid care, and PRCARE3 is the price of care per hour of paid care per
child in paid care.  PRCARE3 is the price of care measure utilized by David Ribar (JHR, 1992).
Recall, however, that he had to implement some guesswork to sort total care hours into paid
versus unpaid hours of care.
10
Additional data not available in the SIPP were incorporated to provide information at the
state level regarding child care regulation.
11  Two variables describing the differences in child care
regulations across states are incorporated as regressors in the child care price equation.  These
variables are included as measures of child care quality in that they describe the degree of child
supervision and the quality of providers.  MAX3YEAR equals one when the maximum child to
staff ratio in center care is less than or equal to 10:1 for three year-olds.  FADTRAIN equals one
when first aid training is required of care-providers in child care centers.    
Note that these two measures focus on regulated center-based care because the percentage
of center care that is successfully regulated is considerably greater than that of family day care
homes.  Many family day care situations which, according to state law SHOULD be regulated,
are not actually subject to any sort of state regulation or licensing.
IV. RESULTS
Results from the labor force participation (LFP) probit and wage equation are found in
Table 3.  The results for both equations are consistent with those usually described in the relevant
literature.  Increases in age and years of education cause an increase in the probability of LFP and
in the wage.  Having children ages 0-2 and ages 3-5 decrease the LFP probability for single and
married mothers.  Finally, increases in the number of children causes both the wage and the
probability of LFP to fall.  NUMKIDS is included as a regressor in the wage equation as a proxy
for intermittent work history.14
Results from the LFP and pay-for-care bivariate probit are presented in Tables 4A and 4B.
Note that the correlation coefficient (RHO) is not significant in the single sample but is significant
for married mothers.  This implies that the correlation between labor force participation and
paying for care is stronger for married women.  As in the single equation LFP probit, years of
education and age are positively related to the probability of LFP.  While increases in nonlabor
income reduce the probability of LFP for married mothers, the coefficient associated with
nonlabor income is not significant for the single sample.  Recall that husband's earned income is
included in the married mother's nonlabor income measure.  Having very young children reduces
the probability of LFP for both samples.  In the sample-selected pay-for-care probit, having
another adult in the household who is not working has a statistically significant negative impact
on the probability of paying for care.  Additionally, having children ages 0-2 and 3-5 increases
the probability of paying for care in both samples.  Note that having an older child in the
household (indicated by KID13_17) reduces the probability of paying for care.  Finally, the
mothers' years of education and race have no significant impact on the probability of paying for
care in either sample, but an increase in nonlabor income does increase the probability of paying
for care for married mothers.
Results from the child care price equation estimated with the bivariate selection correction
are in Table 5.  See that only one of the selection correction terms, LAMBDA1, is statistically
significant for single mothers, while neither are significant for married mothers.  For married
mothers, increases in the number of preschool children, living in a metropolitan area, and living
in a state with high average wages tend to increase the price paid for care.  For single mothers,
living in a state with a maximum 10-to-1 child-staff ratio permitted for three year-olds in center
care (marginally significantly) increases the price paid for care.  Neither of the two child care
quality controls strongly affects the price of care for single or married mothers.
The results for the primary estimating equations are in Tables 6A and 6b.  Note that the
results in these tables are derivatives.  Recall that the primary equations are the LFP probit, and
the hours of paid care tobit.  These two equations include the predicted hourly wage
(PREDWAGE) and the predicted hourly price of child care (PREDPRCR) as regressors, along
with YRSEDUC, NONWHITE, NONLABY, AGE, AGE2, KID0_2, KID3_5, and ADCGRANT.
The presence of preschool children is included as measures of tastes for leisure.  
In the married and single samples, increases in the price of care (statistically significantly)
reduce the probability of LFP, while increases in the potential market wage increase the LFP
probability.  These basic results are consistent with the implications of the underlying behavioral
model as well as basic intuition.  Mothers will be less likely to seek market work if the costs of
taking a job are higher, and they will be more likely to seek work, the greater the difference
between the market wage and the opportunity cost of their time.  
By calculating participation elasticities, the magnitudes of the impact of changes in these
two key variables can be compared across samples.  According to Connelly (1991), "the larger
the quality component of child care, the less negative we expect the effect of child care costs on15
mother's labor market decisions to be."  Available evidence suggests that married family's child
care expenditures are more responsive to quality factors than care expenditures in families with
single mothers.  This suggests that the child care price elasticity for single mothers should be
greater than that of married mothers--a conclusion supported by my results.  The child care price
elasticity for employment for single mothers is -0.521, whereas the corresponding cost elasticity
for married mothers is -0.309.  This cost elasticity for married mothers is smaller but fairly
similar to that found by Connelly (1992) and Blau and Robins (1988).  Their cost elasticities were
-0.49 and -0.38.  Ribar's cost elasticity of -0.74 for married women is significantly larger than
what other researchers have found.  Ribar explains that his higher cost elasticities may be a result
of the manner in which he defined his hourly cost measure.  In his research, cost of care is defined
as child care expenditures per hour of care utilized per child.  Blau and Robins, as well as
Connelly and the research presented in this paper, rely on the definition of expenditures per child
per hour worked, a measure that may mix cost and utilization effects.   According to Connelly
(1992), this disagreement across papers in the cost elasticity for married mothers is one of the
most important unanswered child care research questions.
Using PRCARE2 and PRCARE3 (as defined earlier), I recalculated the child care cost
elasticities.  These elasticities are shown in Table 7.  See that defining hourly cost of care in terms
of hours of care rather than hours of work (as in PRCARE1), causes the child care cost elasticity
to fall for single mothers but rise for married mothers.  And, the care elasticity that uses the
definition of the price of care comparable to Ribar's definition causes married mothers' cost
elasticity to fall to !0.191.  This is considerably lower than the cost elasticity for married mothers
resulting from PRCARE1.  Recall that Ribar's cost elasticity for married mothers is !0.74.  I have
been unable to produce his larger cost elasticity by relying on his definition of the price of care.
This may be a result of my ability to precisely identify hours of paid versus unpaid care.
In order to provide evidence regarding the likely affects of child care policies that reduce
the cost of child care, I have calculated the mean predicted probabilities of labor force
participation for single mothers using the actual (predicted) price of care, 50 percent of this care
price, then with free care.  For single mothers, the mean predicted probability of labor force
participation using the actual price of care is 0.576; with half of this care cost subsidized, the
mean predicted LFP probability rises to 0.702, and with free care the LFP probability rises to
0.806.  For single mothers currently receiving AFDC support, the mean predicted probability of
LFP using the actual price of care is 0.121, and with half-cost care, then free care, that mean LFP
probability rises to 0.260 and 0.462, respectively.  While these simulations are implemented
without regard to potential general equilibrium effects, they indicate that single mothers' labor
force participation behavior can be expected to respond strongly to subsidized child care.
Connelly (1990) estimates a child care cost elasticity for single mothers while controlling
the endogeneity of AFDC participation.  Her resulting cost elasticity is quite low and statistically
insignificant.  When I estimate the LFP probit jointly with an AFDC participation probit, the
resulting child care cost elasticity is also small but it is negative and significant at the 10% level.
The bivariate probit estimates imply a reduction in the potential effectiveness of providing child16
care subsidies to encourage low income single mothers to participate in the labor market.
However, this dampening effect may be altered by more clearly modelling the jointness of the
LFP and AFDC participation decisions.  Specifically, the two choices may be better represented
as a switching model, in which the AFDC choice is the observed switching mechanism.  In this
way, the LFP probit is essentially estimated twice--first conditioned in YESAFDC=1, then
conditioned on YESAFDC=0.  This sort of modelling improvement should be a key component
of any future research in this area.
Just as the child care cost elasticities differ markedly across marital status, there is also a
significant difference between the wage elasticities across marital status.  Single mothers' labor
force participation is much more responsive to changes in the wage as that of married mothers,
where the two wage elasticities are 0.953 and 0.577 respectively.  The reader can see in Table 7
that the wage elasticity is not substantially affected by altering the price of care measure used in
the probit regression. 
Also in the LFP probit, see in Table 6A that nonlabor income significantly reduces the
married mothers' willingness to participate in the labor force but does not impact single mothers'
LFP behavior.  However, the maximum AFDC grant available in the mother's state has a small
but significantly negative impact on married mother's participation behavior but no impact on
married mothers' LFP behavior.
The results for the paid child care hours tobit equations are also shown in Tables 6A and
6B.  Increases in the price of care have a strong negative impact on the utilization of paid child
care hours, although the impact is stronger for married mothers.  Increases in the wage increase
paid hours utilization nearly identically for married and single mothers.  Finally, having preschool
children increases the use of paid care for mothers but reduces the utilization of paid child care
for single mothers. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE RESEARCH
Three fundamental conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in this paper.
First, the type and intensity of child care modes differs by marital status.  Second, the wage and
the price of child care have strong effects on the probability of labor force participation.  Third,
because of this strong relationship between the price of care and LFP, policies that serve to reduce
the price of care are likely to have strong impacts on LFP rates.
The research area of child care and employment behavior is a relatively new one for
economists, with the bulk of the empirical evidence having appeared in the past five years.  There
has been little agreement in these research efforts regarding the magnitude of the impact of child
care costs on labor force participation, and very little evidence regarding the relationship between
child care costs and employment behavior for single mothers.  Therefore, it should be obvious that
there still exists a need for quality child care research.  However, if there is any doubt, one need17
only peruse the chapter entitled "Barriers to Employment" in the recent book by Lawrence Mead
(The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America, 1992).  Without citing any of
the recently published (but circulated for some time) child care research conducted by economists,
Mead concludes that child care cost and availability is no barrier to employment for low income
women.  This conclusion is inconsistent with the current evidence on the subject and serves only
to strengthen the current conservative trend in U.S. political thought.  Hopefully, my research will
contribute to the body of knowledge needed to counter that sort of uninformed, but potentially
powerful, policy-oriented publication.
In future research, I plan to consider the potential endogeneity of two key sets of
regressors--the presence and number of children ages 0-2, and household composition.  Connelly
(1992) finds that the presence of children 0-2 is endogenous to LFP and care decisions.  It is likely
that household composition variables will suffer from greater endogeneity problems for the simple
reason that it is easier (quicker) to alter the composition of a household than to "make" a baby.
Additionally, as discussed earlier, I plan to modify the modelling and implementation of the joint
LFDC and AFDC equations.  
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Key Variable Means
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Primary Care Arrangements for Children of Single Mothers
Paid Care Unpaid Care
Age # 5 Age 6-12 Age # 5 Age 6-12 Total










































Primary Care Arrangements for Children of Married Mothers
Paid Care Unpaid Care
Age # 5 Age 6-12 Age # 5 Age 6-12 Total










































Labor Force Participation Probit and Wage Coefficient Estimates
(estimated as two-step Heckit; t-statistics in parentheses)
Married Single



















































































































R-SQUARED -- 0.2204 -- 0.2029
LOG-LIKELIHOOD -1527.3 -- -420.6 --
 * Significant at 0.05 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.01 level of confidence.26
Table 4A
Bivariate Probit Coefficient Estimates for Married Mothers
(t-statistic in parentheses)




























































 * Significant at the 0.05 level of confidence; ** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.27
Table 4B
Bivariate Probit Coefficient Estimates for Single Mothers
(t-statistic in parentheses)




























































 * Significant at the 0.05 level of confidence; ** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.28
Table 5
Child Care Expenditures with Bivariate Selection Correction
(t-statistic in parentheses)














































* Significant at 0.10 level of confidence; ** Significant at 0.05 level of confidence; *** Significant at 0.01 level
 of confidence.29
Table 6A
LFP and Paid Child Care Hours Equations--Derivatives
Married Mothers
(t-statistic in parentheses)












































PDF @ MEANS 
 (OR CDF)
0.375 0.236
 * Significant at the 0.05 level of confidence; ** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.30
Table 6B
LFP and Paid Child Care Hours Equations--Derivatives
Single Mothers
(t-statistic in parentheses)












































 * Significant at the 0.05 level of confidence; ** Significant at the 0.01 level of confidence.31
Table 7























* Coefficient not statistically significant.